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Benjamin P. Edwards†* & Ann C. McGinley** 
“Venture bearding,” a term that we coin in this Article, describes 
processes of obscuring and covering socially stigmatized identities in 
business environments. This Article introduces distinctive identity 
performance strategies from the technology, startup, and venture capital 
context into the legal literature and discusses what their existence explains 
about business environments and capital formation. Venture bearding, as 
we use the term, describes behaviors that persons with contextually 
stigmatized identities adopt to access social status and capital. In some 
instances, women, who are stigmatized in this context, may employ men 
as front persons to conceal that the venture is an exclusively women-
owned business. Venture bearding is a common, complex, and problematic 
strategy and is driven by stigma and bias in the business environment. 
The Article focuses on how the current startup, technology, and venture 
capital landscape causes persons with stigmatized identities to 
strategically conceal facets of their female identities in favor of presenting 
masculinized identities to conduct business and raise capital. The Article 
charts a continuum of venture bearding practices ranging from techniques 
to downplay a founder’s identity to the actual employment of men for the 
purpose of deriving economic value from their identities. 
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The existence of venture bearding raises critical capital allocation 
concerns. While venture bearding strategies may mitigate some capital 
allocation biases and benefit some entrepreneurs, employing these 
strategies risks reifying discriminatory norms. These norms increase the 
cost of capital and inhibit economic growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Predicting who will succeed is an imperfect art, but also, 
sometimes, a self-fulfilling prophecy. When venture capitalists 
say — and they do say — “We think it’s young white men, 
ideally Ivy League dropouts, who are the safest bets,” then 
invest only in young white men with Ivy League backgrounds, 
of course young white men with Ivy League backgrounds are 
the only ones who make money for them. They’re also the 
only ones who lose money for them. 
—Ellen Pao 
THIS IS HOW SEXISM WORKS IN SILICON VALLEY1 
The cutoff in investors’ heads is 32 . . . . After 32, they start to 
be a little skeptical. . . . I can be tricked by anyone who looks 
like Mark Zuckerberg. There was a guy once who we funded 
who was terrible. I said: “How could he be bad? He looks like 
Zuckerberg!” 
—Paul Graham 
FOUNDER, Y COMBINATOR2 
Penelope Gazin and Kate Dwyer faced a familiar problem.3 Like many 
female founders, they discovered that developers, graphic designers, and 
other outsiders were often condescending and disrespectful in emails.4 
 
 1 Ellen Pao, This Is How Sexism Works in Silicon Valley, CUT (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.thecut.com/2017/08/ellen-pao-silicon-valley-sexism-reset-excerpt.html 
[hereinafter How Sexism Works]. 
 2 Nathaniel Rich, Silicon Valley’s Start-Up Machine, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/magazine/y-combinator-silicon-valleys-start-up-
machine.html?pagewanted=all. After public criticism of this statement, Paul Graham 
released a statement indicating that the quotation “was a joke.” Paul Graham, “I Can 
Be Tricked by Anyone Who Looks Like Mark Zuckerberg,” PAUL GRAHAM (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.paulgraham.com/tricked.html (“People will probably still repeat that 
quote, but now if someone does it will be proof that either (a) they didn’t do their 
research or (b) they have an ideological axe to grind.”). Regardless of whether the 
statement was intended as a joke at the time it was made, it resonates because of the 
widespread bias toward allocating capital to particular classes of founders. Ellen Pao 
confirms that investors place a great emphasis on finding young male venture 
capitalists’ projects in which to invest. See ELLEN K. PAO, RESET: MY FIGHT FOR 
INCLUSION AND LASTING CHANGE 66-82 (2017) [hereinafter RESET].  
 3 John Paul Titlow, These Women Entrepreneurs Created a Fake Male Cofounder to 
Dodge Startup Sexism, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/ 
40456604/these-women-entrepreneurs-created-a-fake-male-cofounder-to-dodge-startup-
sexism. 
 4 Id. 
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One developer even began an email with “okay girls.”5 Another 
attempted to “stealthily delete everything” on their website when Gazin 
declined an invitation to go on a date with him.6 
To sidestep the constant conflict and secure better treatment, Gazin 
and Dwyer presented their business with a masculine identity.7 The 
two created an email account for a fictitious third cofounder named 
Keith Mann.8 Developers treated Mr. Mann differently than they 
treated the female founders. Developers responded to the imaginary 
man’s messages more quickly and respectfully.9 While they recognized 
the injustice in how they were treated, the female founders embraced 
the strategy, accepting that “this is clearly just part of this world that 
we’re in right now. We want this and want to make this happen.”10 
For all founders, the size, shape, and frequency of the obstacles they 
face shifts with perceptions about their identities. Identity alters the 
economic landscape because venture capitalists, developers, and 
others may consciously and unconsciously modulate their behavior 
depending on the perceived identity of the founder.11 In some 
instances, identity grants a person access to social or economic 
benefits.12 In others, it acts as a friction, increasing transaction costs 
and making interactions more difficult.13 Gazin and Dwyer opted to 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; see also Hannah-Rose Yee, These Entrepreneurs Made Up a Fake Male Co-
founder to Deal with Sexism, N.Y. POST (Aug. 30, 2017, 3:38 PM), 
http://nypost.com/2017/08/30/these-entrepreneurs-made-up-a-fake-male-co-founder-
to-deal-with-sexism/. 
 7 Titlow, supra note 3. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. (quoting Kate Dwyer). 
 11 See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE 48-52, 111-22 (2013) (explaining that implicit biases held by people as 
measured by the Implicit Association Test are related to behavior resulting from those 
biases in both the race and gender contexts); Judge Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, 
Employment Law: Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS 
THE LAW 80, 81-86 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (arguing that in 
deciding employment discrimination cases federal judges exercise implicit bias, which 
harms plaintiffs); Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations: We 
Must Do Better Than This, 35 JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, 306 (2014) (“[E]veryone is exposed 
to the societal stereotypes associated with different categories of people. It is through 
the lens of these stereotypes that we perceive, process, store, recall, and synthesize 
information about people.”). 
 12 See Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2016) 
(“Each of these individuals is what I will call an identity entrepreneur — someone who 
leverages his or her identity as a means of deriving social or economic value.”). 
 13 Cf. Claire Cain Miller, Google Releases Employee Data, Illustrating Tech’s 
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present outsiders with a masculine identity because it reduced 
transaction costs and allowed them to devote more time and attention 
to launching and growing their business.14 
Research shows that uncorrected implicit biases pervade the 
business environment, tilting the investment decisions made by 
venture capitalists toward men.15 Because venture capitalists are 
overwhelmingly white and male, they may be particularly vulnerable 
to implicit bias in favor of white male founders in evaluating 
investment opportunities.16 
The digital passing strategy employed by Gazin and Dwyer 
exemplifies an instance of what we will call venture bearding. We use 
the term to describe the techniques used by women and others in 
technology and venture capital firms either to pass for an idealized 
masculine identity or to cover their otherwise stigmatized identities 
and deflect attention from their differences for the purpose of 
accessing social and economic resources.17 In many instances venture 
bearding involves the sublimation of a woman’s identity and role 
within a business and the elevation of a man’s position. By shifting a 
masculine identity into the foreground, a woman may access social 
and economic resources that would otherwise be out of reach. 
 
Diversity Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 6:42 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2014/05/28/google-releases-employee-data-illustrating-techs-diversity-challenge/?_r=0 
(“[W]omen who try to start tech companies face exclusion by a venture capital 
network dominated by a chummy fraternity of men.”). 
 14 See Titlow, supra note 3. 
 15 For more details on these implicit preferences, see infra notes 132–56, and 
accompanying text. 
 16 See Dan Lyons, Jerks and the Start-Ups They Ruin, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (Apr. 1, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/opinion/sunday/jerks-and-the-start-ups-
they-ruin.html?_r=0 (stating that as of 2014, only “[six] percent” of “investing 
partners at venture capital companies were women”); Somini Sengupta, If You’re a 
Venture Capitalist, You’re Most Likely a White Man, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Nov. 22, 2011, 
10:42 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/if-youre-a-venture-capitalist-
youre-most-likely-a-white-man/ (reporting that “[eighty-seven] percent identified 
themselves as white, [nine] percent were Asian, [two] percent black or Latino, with 
the remaining [two] percent calling themselves ‘mixed race.’”). 
 17 In discussing identities through the lens of commonly accepted categories, the 
analysis risks essentializing conceptions of whiteness, nonwhiteness, masculinity, and 
femininity. This degree of reduction puts the gradations between and inherent 
arbitrariness of identity categories to the side. In many instances, the lines between 
white and non-white blur. See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: 
The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 33 
(2013) (describing how “[George] Shishim became the first immigrant from the Arab 
World to be naturalized as an American and judicially ruled white by law”). 
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The term venture bearding evocatively encapsulates the presentation 
of masculinity. A beard symbolizes masculinity, and as facial hair 
increases, men and women rate bearded men as more masculine.18 
Men and women in some societies view bearded men as enjoying 
higher social status, and men see bearded men as more aggressive.19 In 
the United States, in the mid-1990s there emerged a “craze” that 
experts say rivals the facial hair movement of the 1960s, a movement 
that continues today.20 In colloquial usage, the term “beard” has 
referred to women who provide a cloak of heterosexuality for gay and 
bisexual men.21 By their presence, these women seemingly confirm a 
man’s heterosexual masculinity. Actual beards (or their absence) have 
long been used to convey information about a person’s identity. 
Historically, Jews and others facing persecution shaved their beards to 
avoid stigma.22 Others have grown beards to blend in and pass for 
locals in beard-wearing cultures.23 Some grow beards to obscure their 
faces and true thoughts.24 As a term, venture bearding aims to convey 
 
 18 See Barnaby J. Dixson & Robert C. Brooks, The Role of Facial Hair in Women’s 
Perceptions of Men’s Attractiveness, Health, Masculinity and Parenting Abilities, 34 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 236, 240 (2013) (finding that ratings of masculinity rose 
with beardedness, and facial hair correlates with ideas of maturity, dominance, and 
aggression). See generally CHRISTOPHER OLDSTONE-MOORE, OF BEARDS AND MEN: THE 
REVEALING HISTORY OF FACIAL HAIR 1-4 (2015) (describing how beards have been 
associated with conceptions of masculinity). 
 19 See, e.g., Barnaby J. Dixson & Paul L. Vasey, Beards Augment Perceptions of 
Men’s Age, Social Status, and Aggressiveness, but Not Attractiveness, 23 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 
481, 486 (2012) (“[M]en and women from NZ and Samoa judged neutral faces with 
beards as having higher social status” and “[m]en also judged bearded faces posing 
angry facial expressions as more aggressive than clean-shaven faces.”).  
 20 See ALLAN PETERKIN, ONE THOUSAND BEARDS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF FACIAL HAIR 
190-91 (2001) (describing the popularity of different types of beards from goatees to 
“snail trails”). 
 21 See Marc A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: “Jews,” “Homosexuals,” and the Inclusion of 
Sexual Orientation as a Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 37, 46 (2001) (“One shared symbol of self-censorship is the ‘beard.’ 
Jewish men shaved their beards to indicate that they were becoming modernized. Gay 
men brought ‘beards’ — women whom they seemed to be dating — to public 
functions to suggest that they were heterosexual.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., James Brooke, Vigilance and Memory: Kandahar; Pentagon Tells Troops 
in Afghanistan: Shape Up and Dress Right, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/12/us/vigilance-memory-kandahar-pentagon-tells-
troops-afghanistan-shape-up-dress-right.html (“For several months, the Special 
Operations Forces soldiers whom the United States sent to Afghanistan have been 
growing beards and donning local garb in an effort to blend in with the local people 
and their surroundings.”). 
 24 See Alex Williams, What Your Beard Says About You, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011), 
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deflection, concealment, drag, and the projection of an idealized 
masculinity.25 
Venture bearding may take many forms. In some instances, it occurs 
at the intersection of entity formation and identity negotiation. Venture 
bearding occurs when: (1) a woman substitutes a man in her place as 
the face of an entity to mitigate gender bias; or (2) a woman includes a 
man (a tactic we call manclusion) in economic activities because his 
masculine presence offers a passport to better treatment. Venture 
bearding also occurs through traditional identity performances where 
women seek to pass for men in electronically-mediated discourse, or 
otherwise take steps to deflect attention from their differences. 
The literature contains rich discussions about how persons with 
stigmatized identities manage their identity presentation to assimilate, 
pass for white, or to cover stigmatized aspects of their identities.26 This 
Article expands the academic literature by introducing distinctive 
identity performance strategies from the technology, startup, and 
venture capital context. It contributes to the legal literature by 
discussing what their existence signifies about the business 
environment and capital formation.27 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/fashion/what-your-beard-says-about-you-the-
mirror.html (“A beard is a mask as much as a fashion accessory, hiding the ‘you’ that 
everyone knows as you and replacing it with whatever they happen to associate with 
the phrase ‘guys with beards.’”). 
 25 See Ridhi Tariyal, To Succeed in Silicon Valley, You Still Have to Act Like a Man, 
WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/ 
wp/2018/07/24/to-succeed-in-silicon-valley-you-still-have-to-act-like-a-man/?utm_term= 
.bbb801e316a4 (“When women pitch mostly male investors, we essentially do it in drag. 
We ‘code’ male. We may no longer wear the shoulder pads of the 1980s but that is because 
dress, vernacular and careful selection of cultural touchstones are the superficial 
accoutrements of a gendered performance. Women have advanced the art much further.”). 
 26 In his oft-cited article, Kenji Yoshino drew from the sociological literature and 
distinguished between passing and covering. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 
769, 772 (2002) (“Passing means the underlying identity is not altered, but hidden. 
Passing occurs when a lesbian presents herself to the world as straight. Covering 
means the underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.”). See 
generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN 
“POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 35-38 (2013) [hereinafter ACTING WHITE?] (discussing the 
“working identity” of blacks and the choices that black workers make as to how to 
present their identities in a way that is socially acceptable to those in predominantly 
white workplaces). 
 27 A search for the terms “implicit bias” and “venture capital” within the same 
sentence returned no results in Westlaw’s secondary source database. Notably, the 
Article is also informed by our experiences as a man and a woman who researches and 
writes about men. In particular, men do not often write about gender issues. See Corey 
Rayburn, Why Are You Taking Gender and the Law?: Deconstructing the Norms That 
Keep Men Out of the Law School’s “Pink Ghetto,” 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 74-75 
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Part I examines how gender bias distorts capital allocation. That 
Part reviews how pervasive gender bias increases capital costs for 
founders who do not conform to the idealized young, white, male Ivy 
League-dropout norm.28 It examines how these identity-based 
preferences stigmatize many persons, especially women, who do not 
conform to the idealized norms.29 It details how the business 
environment shifts along identity lines, making it substantially more 
difficult for many to raise capital.30 For women, this often means that 
investors seek to negotiate sexual access to their bodies instead of, or 
alongside, a standard term sheet.31 In contrast, young men often 
benefit from a social subsidy, favored by explicit and implicit 
preferences.32 
Part II analyzes identity performance theory and applies it to the 
strategies many founders now employ to reduce their cost of capital 
and access economic and social resources. For individuals with 
stigmatized identities, forced assimilation toward an idealized 
masculine identity often occurs in three ways: conversion, passing, 
and covering.33 In utilizing digital passing strategies, female founders 
may simply remove clear markers of their femininity in electronically 
mediated exchanges or operate from behind masculine handles and 
sobriquets. These mediated modes of interaction may allow them, for a 
 
(2003) (“For the most part, men are not teaching, writing about, or taking classes that 
address gender issues. The numbers are astonishing and if institutional arrangements 
remain the same there is little hope for change since the norms against male 
involvement are deeply imbedded in the educational environment.”).  
 28 See Pao, How Sexism Works, supra note 1 (describing the preference for young, 
white men that have dropped out of an Ivy League institution). 
 29 See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2226 n.8 (2013) 
[hereinafter Racial Capitalism] (“The intersection of race with other identity 
categories, such as gender, class, and sexual orientation, affects the degree of privilege 
that any individual white person in fact experiences . . . .”). 
 30 See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, It’s Called the “Pao Effect” — Asian Women in Tech are 
Fighting Deep-Rooted Discrimination, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:21 PM ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/09/19/ellen-pao-asian-women-tech-
glass-ceiling-bamboo-ceiling/665822001/ (describing how one founder “was 
approached by an investor at a pitch competition. It was only after the investor lured 
her on a business trip to New York that she realized the offer to help her raise money 
was a ruse to sleep with her”). 
 31 See PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 143 (“I’ve heard too many stories from women 
CEOs about their struggles to be treated fairly when asking VCs for funding. They get 
talked over, interrupted, ignored, leered at, and propositioned.”). 
 32 See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 371-72 (2004) 
[hereinafter Masculinities at Work] (explaining how men benefit from a “patriarchal 
dividend” allowing them greater access to resources simply because they are male). 
 33 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 772. 
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time, to pass as persons with idealized identities. As a term, venture 
bearding also aims to capture how a strong discriminatory animus now 
causes outgroup members to perform their identities in ways aimed at 
deflecting dominant group member attention from their difference.34 
Part III examines legal avenues to address systemic discrimination 
and bias. Although existing anti-discrimination laws do not apply to 
situations outside of the traditional employer-employee relationship, 
the venture capital industry faces strong incentives to address 
significant distributive justice concerns as well as the inefficiencies of 
the current discriminatory environment.35 Pervasive gender-
discrimination in technology reduces the supply of technology 
workers by deterring entry into the field. It also inhibits capital 
formation, skews capital allocation, and may generate less useful 
innovation and lower returns than an environment that allocates 
capital more efficiently. 
Although we focus on the American technology and venture capital 
context, persons with contextually stigmatized identities will 
undoubtedly adopt similar strategies in other business environments. 
I. GENDER BIAS AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
To showcase how systemic bias affects capital allocation, this Part 
reviews how gender bias inhibits women seeking to raise capital. It 
shows that gender bias misallocates social resources, causing harm to 
all stakeholders and generating less useful development than would 
otherwise occur. 
A. Gender Bias Exists 
When venture capitalists fund business development, they direct 
disproportionate amounts toward male entrepreneurs. In 2016, all-male 
firms raised $58.2 billion in venture capital funding.36 In contrast, all-
female firms raised only $1.46 billion.37 Although these numbers do not 
reveal funding disparities per founder, other research has revealed the 
 
 34 See id. (defining covering).  
 35 This is particularly true today given the #MeToo movement and the important 
repercussions it is having throughout many industries. See Stephanie Zacharek et al., 
The Silence Breakers, TIME (2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-
silence-breakers/ (naming the #MeToo women as the magazine’s Person of the Year). 
 36 Valentina Zarya, Venture Capital’s Funding Gender Gap is Actually Getting Worse, 
FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/female-founders-venture-
capital/. 
 37 Id. 
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stark contrast for individuals seeking capital: “Black-female-founded 
start-ups raised an average of $36,000, while the white-male-led start-
ups that failed raised an average of $1.3 million.”38 
Several factors may influence the persistent differentials.39 The 
pipeline to technology firms plays some role. If fewer women seek 
funding or launch technology startups, that differential would affect 
relative funding levels. Now, only about eighteen percent of computer 
science degrees go to women.40 This number peaked at thirty-seven in 
1984. But women have been discouraged by universities and the 
industry from pursuing degrees in computer science, and their 
percentage has decreased significantly in the past thirty years.41 While 
the pipeline is a problem, industry conditions also contribute to 
decisions about whether to take or leave jobs in the industry.42 Female 
 
 38 Doree Shafrir, How Ingrained is Sexism in Silicon Valley? Ask the Women Trying 
to Get Funding, CUT (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/04/women-
entrepreneurs-talk-about-sexism-in-silicon-valley.html. 
 39 A variety of additional factors compound the ones detailed here. This is not an 
attempt at an exhaustive list. Rather, the factors highlighted establish that the business 
environment in startups, technology, and venture capital now segments along gender 
lines, with female entrepreneurs facing higher capital costs because of the 
stigmatization of their identities. Moreover, one group of theorists suggests that the 
divergence between male and female lending in venture capital occurs because 
uncertainty, which is great at the funding stage by venture capitalists, plays a role in 
emphasizing the manifestation of bias. See Sarah Thébaud & Amanda J. Sharkey, 
Unequal Hard Times: The Influence of the Great Recession on Gender Bias in 
Entrepreneurial Financing, 3 SOC. SCI. 1, 24 (2016). 
 40 Liza Mundy, Why Is Silicon Valley So Awful to Women?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/why-is-silicon-valley-so-awful-
to-women/517788/ (“The percentage of female computer- and information-science 
majors peaked in 1984, at about 37 percent. It has declined, more or less steadily, ever 
since. Today it stands at 18 percent.”). 
 41 See Emily Chang, Women Once Ruled the Computer World. When Did Silicon Valley 
Become Brotopia?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2018, 1:00 AM PST), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-02-01/women-once-ruled-computers-
when-did-the-valley-become-brotopia [hereinafter Women Once Ruled]. 
 42 Women who know they will face constant discrimination in a particular field 
may decide to pursue other vocations. See CATHERINE HILL ET AL., AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. 
WOMEN, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND 
MATHEMATICS 24, 70 (2010), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Why-So-Few-
Women-in-Science-Technology-Engineering-and-Mathematics.pdf (finding that in 
STEM careers, women’s sense of isolation, unsupportive work environments, extreme 
work schedules and unclear rules concerning advancement are major factors in 
women’s decisions to leave the organization); Isis H. Settles et al., Derogation, 
Discrimination, and (Dis)Satisfaction With Jobs in Science: A Gendered Analysis, 37 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 179, 181, 185 (2012) (stating that perceptions of both men and 
women that the organization is sexist leads to lower job satisfaction and that even 
when perceptions are inaccurate, workers make decisions about involvement and 
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entrepreneurs receive significantly less venture capital in large part 
because of the rhetoric about gender stereotypes that accompanies 
funding decisions.43 Consider the general hostility expressed by one 
former financial sector employee turned technology firm founder who 
characterized Silicon Valley’s women as: 
[S]oft and weak, cosseted and naïve despite their claims of 
worldliness, and generally full of shit. They have their self-
regarding entitlement feminism, and ceaselessly vaunt their 
independence, but the reality is, come the epidemic plague or 
foreign invasion, they’d become precisely the sort of useless 
baggage you’d trade for a box of shotgun shells or a jerry can 
of diesel.44 
This is not an isolated sentiment. Young men in high tech and 
engineering firms voice and demonstrate hostility towards their 
female colleagues.45 This type of behavior also occurs in venture 
 
commitment and even leave organizations based on perceptions of sexism). Women 
are perceived as incompetent in STEM jobs, but if competent, they are often perceived 
to be unlikeable. Women who are competent must demonstrate themselves as more 
communal in order to be liked than men, but there is a double edge sword because if a 
woman tries to be too communal, she will be perceived to be incompetent. See HILL ET 
AL., supra, at 86. 
 43 Malin Malmstrom et al., Gender Stereotypes and Venture Support Decisions: How 
Government Venture Capitalists Socially Construct Entrepreneurs’ Potential, 41 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 833, 847 (2017) (finding that government venture 
capitalists used stereotypical language about both men and women when discussing 
whether to fund their projects: men were described as agentic, innovative, credible, 
trustworthy, very competent, experienced, and knowledgeable, whereas women were 
described as needing support, of questionable credibility, lacking in competence, and 
having questionable experience and knowledge). 
 44 ANTONIO GARCÌA MARTÌNEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE FORTUNE AND RANDOM 
FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY 57 (2016). 
 45 SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR: REVERSING THE BRAIN DRAIN IN 
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 7-11 (2008) [hereinafter THE ATHENA 
FACTOR] (detailing extremely hostile, predatory behavior toward women in Science, 
Education, and Technology (“SET”) jobs, including isolation, sexually explicit taunts, 
attitudes that women are less competent, and “geek” culture refusal to acknowledge 
women in their presence or mistaking women for administrative assistants). In an 
updated study, the same authors found less hostile behavior, and a continuing rich 
pipeline of qualified women; women were discouraged, however, with twenty-seven 
percent believing their careers were stalled, thirty-two percent saying they were likely 
to quit within a year, and forty-six percent concluding that men in senior management 
saw men as “leadership material” more readily than women. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT 
ET AL., CENTER FOR TALENT INNOVATION, ATHENA FACTOR 2.0: ACCELERATING FEMALE 
TALENT IN SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2014), 
http://www.talentinnovation.org/assets/Athena-2-ExecSummFINAL-CTI.pdf.  
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firms.46 One young woman at a leading technology firm states, “It 
reminds me of the antelope and lion footage you see in nature films. 
The culture is extremely predatory, and the women are the prey.”47 In 
a study of engineering and technology firms, more than one quarter of 
the women studied complained that their male colleagues consider 
them to be less capable and “genetically disadvantaged.”48 
However, the masculine dominance of technology firms was not 
inevitable. In fact, a recent book by Emily Chang demonstrates that 
women predominated among the first computer programmers and 
were drummed out of tech businesses because of the ill-conceived 
notion that the best programmers were anti-social.49 Since those early 
days, women have received the message that they are not welcome 
through a failure of recruiting or mentoring or downright 
discrimination, and the move to hire male “nerds” as computer 
programmers. 50 
Moreover, the environments in tech, engineering, and venture firms 
are disproportionately masculine: they value extremely long work 
hours and offer little space between personal life and work life. Long 
work hours, complete dedication to pursuit of work, and the ability to 
work 24/7 are characteristics of workplaces that are identified as 
masculine, prestigious, upper middle class, and white.51 In fact, 
workplaces with these qualities allow men to perform and enhance 
 
 46 See, e.g., PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 121-45 (describing her treatment in the 
industry and her lawsuit for sex discrimination); Katie Benner, Women in Tech Speak 
Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-out-sexual-harassment.html 
(describing sexual harassment of women in the tech industry); Silicon Valley’s Sexism 
Problem, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/ 
21720621-venture-capitalists-are-bright-clannish-and-almost-exclusively-male-silicon-
valleys-sexism (noting that tech in general and Silicon Valley in particular have a 
gender problem with women representing only twenty-one percent of American tech 
executives, sixty percent of women stating in one study that they had experienced 
unwanted sexual advances, and two-thirds feeling excluded from social and 
networking opportunities). 
 47 See HEWLETT ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR, supra note 45, at 9. 
 48 Id. at 10. 
 49 See Chang, Women Once Ruled, supra note 41. 
 50 See id.  
 51 See Richard Collier, Naming Men as Men in Corporate Legal Practice: Gender and 
the Idea of “Virtually 24/7 Commitment” in Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2387, 2403-06 
(2015) (describing the big corporate law firm and the contradiction of the masculine 
environment that feeds men’s sense of identity and the firms’ professed interest in 
wellbeing); Ann C. McGinley, Masculine Law Firms, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 423, 430-
32 (2013) (describing contemporary law firms that value hard work, no flexibility, 
and make it virtually impossible for men to spend much time with their children). 
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their masculinity in the eyes of their co-workers, supervisors, and 
clients. Perhaps more importantly, these environments allow men to 
feel that their work is important and that they are engaged in an elite 
enterprise.52 Therefore, there is little incentive to accommodate the 
schedules of women, or men who are engaged in the “feminine” task 
of care giving. In fact, studies demonstrate that there is a gender 
stereotype bias against workers who take advantage of flexible work 
policies or caregiving leave.53 
In essence, the importance of presence and visibility for long hours 
during workdays and on weekends creates pressure on workers with 
family responsibilities. Men tend to prove their masculinity through 
their relationships to work, and these environments reproduce 
themselves, but women often have greater family responsibilities. 
Because women tend to bear a disproportionate share of familial 
responsibilities, their ability to make the career-maximizing decision 
at every opportunity is often limited.54 Moreover, research 
demonstrates that women who are mothers benefit from more flexible 
schedules, which are difficult to find in these masculine workplaces.55 
Although this dynamic plays a role, other factors, including bias, 
 
 52 See, e.g., Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender 
Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2245, 2271-72 (2010) (describing a new “hypercompetitive ideology” in law firms 
that sees working 24/7 as heroic, identifies particular firms as elite, and thus creates 
no incentive for firms to shorten work days or to refuse to deliver service to clients 
on-demand). 
 53 See Stephanie Bornstein, The Legal and Policy Implications of the “Flexibility 
Stigma,” 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 390-91 (2013). 
 54 See Deborah L. Rhode, Leadership in Law, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1603, 1647 (2017) 
(reporting the view that “[b]ecause of their disproportionate family responsibilities, 
female attorneys are reportedly more likely to reduce their schedules, take time out of 
the workforce, and lack the credentials that could propel them into leadership 
positions”); see also McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 32, at 363 (“While 
many women ‘choose’ to forego careers to spend time with their children, these 
‘choices’ are often ordered by necessity, societal expectations, and lack of 
opportunities.”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for 
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77, 
90-101 (2003) (discussing the relatively new area of family caregivers’ discrimination 
claims, which rely on a number of potential statutory violations, and describing the 
difficulty that mothers often have in workplaces where working very long hours is 
expected, as well as the stereotypes applied to mothers and how they affect their 
working conditions). 
 55 See Ann C. McGinley, Gender, Law, and Culture in the Legal Workplace: A 
Chilean Case Study, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 744-46 (2018) [hereinafter Gender, Law, and 
Culture] (discussing the pleas for flexibility from mothers who are lawyers who were 
interviewed as part of an empirical study of gender and lawyers). 
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stereotypes, and workplace cultures also play a significant role, 
deterring and harming even those women without disproportionate 
family responsibilities.56 
1. Pay Differentials 
For a variety of reasons, the American business environment has 
long returned richer rewards to men, making it more difficult for 
women to accumulate the capital reserves to launch businesses. One 
recent review found that as of 2015 working women were typically 
paid only “80 percent of what men were paid, a gap of twenty 
percent.”57 The gap grows significantly wider “for Hispanic and Latina 
women, who earned only 54 percent of what white men were paid in 
2015.”58 African-American women made only sixty-three percent of 
what white men were paid.59 Although income increases with 
education levels, the gender pay gap remains and sometimes widens at 
higher levels of academic achievement.60 Women are also 
underrepresented in the ranks of senior executives, holding only 
twenty-five percent of these positions as of 2015.61 The pay gap 
reflects not only differential pay for women who have family 
responsibilities, but also a differential that cannot be explained by 
pregnancy, childcare, or other factors. 
The pay gap remains for women in technology. Consider the income 
differential between men and women in software development, a 
traditionally male-dominated field.62 As of 2015, the median male 
software developer earned $1,751 a week.63 The median female 
 
 56 See Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias, 32 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 113, 123-28 (2012); McGinley, Gender, Law, and Culture, supra 
note 55, at 738; JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., THE CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, CLIMATE CONTROL: 
GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IN ENGINEERING? 4-10 (2016), http://worklifelaw.org/ 
publications/Climate-Control-Gender-And-Racial-Bias-In-Engineering.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2018). 
 57 AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 4 
(2017), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.sidnet.org/resource/resmgr/DI_Tool_Kit/The_ 
simple_truth_about_the_g.pdf [hereinafter THE SIMPLE TRUTH].  
 58 Id. at 11. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. at 14. (“At every level of academic achievement, women’s median 
earnings are less than men’s median earnings . . . .”). 
 61 See id. at 20. 
 62 See id. at 18. 
 63 See id. 
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software developer made only $1,415 a week, eighty-one percent of 
the median male earning.64 
Gender pay and status disparities may persist even in leading 
technology firms. An employee-led review found that Google pays its 
female employees less than their male colleagues “at most job levels 
within Google, and the pay disparity extends as women climb the 
corporate ladder.”65 The review found that women across all job levels 
tended to receive lower annual compensation and lower bonuses.66 
Google issued a statement in response to the compiled salary data, 
saying that its own analysis indicated that its women make “99.7 cents 
for every dollar a man makes, accounting for factors like location, 
tenure, job role, level and performance.”67 Nonetheless, Google’s own 
diversity report indicates that women comprise a little under a third of 
its employees and make up about a quarter of its leadership 
positions.68 And, three female employees recently filed suit alleging 
pay discrimination.69 Other tech companies also appear to pay women 
significantly less than their male employees.70 
 
 64 See id. 
 65 Daisuke Wakabayashi, At Google, Employee-Led Effort Finds Men Are Paid More 
than Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/ 
technology/google-salaries-gender-disparity.html?_r=0. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. Google also pointed out that the spreadsheet “does not take into account a 
number of factors, like where employees are based, whether they are in higher-paying 
technical positions, and job performance.” Id. Technical positions receive a pay 
premium at similar job levels. See id. 
 68 See DANIELLE BROWN, GOOGLE DIVERSITY ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 21-22 (2018), 
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/diversity.google/en//static/pdf/Google_ 
Diversity_annual_report_2018.pdf. 
 69 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Sued by 3 Female Ex-Employees Who Say It 
Pays Women Less than Men, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/09/14/technology/google-gender-pay-lawsuit.html. 
 70 See The Gender Pay Gap in Tech, COMPARABLY (June 13, 2016), 
https://www.comparably.com/blog/the-gender-pay-gap-in-tech/; The State of Wage 
Inequality in the Workplace, HIRED, https://hired.com/wage-inequality-report (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2018); Elizabeth Weise, Oracle Is Yet Another Tech Firm Hit with Suit 
for Allegedly Paying Women Less than Men, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2017, 7:57 PM ET), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/29/oracle-yet-another-tech-firm-hit-
suit-allegedly-paying-women-less-than-men/718471001/. The Department of Labor 
also filed a complaint against Oracle for gender pay discrimination. See generally 
Complaint Charging Oracle Am., Inc., No. R00192699, (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/newsroom/newsreleases/OFCCP20170071.pdf. 
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2. Explicit Preferences for Men 
Female founders may face particular challenges in securing capital 
because of explicit preferences for men at two different junctures. A 
significant subset of the financial sector believes that investment 
decisions should be made by men and that wiser investments in the 
venture capital space will be in men. 
a. Explicit Preferences for Men to Make Investment Decisions 
Much of the capital in venture capital comes from other parts of the 
financial sector. Preferences of hedge fund managers shape the flow of 
hedge fund capital to venture capital funds because hedge funds direct 
significant amounts of capital to venture capital firms.71 
Venture capital funds may be overwhelmingly male dominated 
because male hedge fund managers may have more confidence in 
other male investors. For example, one leading hedge fund manager 
expressed concern about whether mothers would make smart 
investment decisions.72 Paul Tudor Jones founded Tudor Investment 
Corporation, one of the world’s largest and most profitable hedge 
funds.73 At one talk, he claimed that motherhood interferes with 
investment prowess, saying that: 
As soon as that baby’s lips touch that girl’s bosom, forget 
it. . . . Every single investment idea, every desire to understand 
what’s going to make this go up or go down, is going to be 
overwhelmed by the most beautiful experience, which a man 
will never share, about a mode of connection between that 
mother and that baby.74 
 
 71 See Alexandra Stevenson, Hedge Funds Are the New Venture Firms, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/hedge-funds-
are-the-new-venture-firms.html (“In Silicon Valley, hedge funds with billion-dollar 
reserves are becoming the new venture capitalists.”). 
 72 See ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., WOMEN IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: A MARATHON, 
NOT A SPRINT 6 (2013), http://txwsw.com/wp-content/uploads/RKWomeninAlternative 
Investments1.14F.pdf. 
 73 Cf. Rob Copeland, Paul Tudor Jones’ New Hedge Fund Pitch: Low, Low Prices, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-tudor-jones-
new-hedge-fund-pitch-low-low-prices-1488214739 (“Paul Tudor Jones for years 
charged some of the highest fees in the hedge-fund industry. Now the billionaire is 
cutting them for the second time in eight months . . . . The former cotton trader rose 
to fame with a big score during 1987’s stock-market crash.”). 
 74 William Alden, When a Billionaire Speaks Off the Cuff on Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 24, 2013, 10:44 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/when-a-
billionaire-speaks-off-the-cuff/. Jones was also pessimistic about the ability of male 
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Reactions to the comments were mixed. Despite the graphic 
depiction of breastfeeding and the use of the term “girl” for a female 
trader, one commentator characterized Jones remarks as directed at “a 
social, structural issue having to do with gender and expectation,” 
explaining that Jones really meant that women faced larger burdens 
than men.75 Others characterized the comments as both “scientifically 
unsound” and as reflecting “what a lot of men on Wall Street actually 
think.”76 
Many persons share the erroneous perception that men, on average, 
make better investors. One survey found that only nine percent of 
women surveyed believed that women make better investors than 
men.77 
However, the data does not support this lack of confidence in 
women as investors. For retail investors, women tend to have higher 
savings rates and higher rates of return than male investors.78 Women 
who manage hedge funds also tend to deliver equivalent or higher 
returns than their male competitors.79 One performance review found 
that female hedge fund managers returned six percent over a six and a 
half year period, outperforming the S&P 500 (4.2%) and a broader 
hedge fund index (-1.1%) over the same period.80 
Recent research indicates that female investor outperformance may 
occur because female investors react differently to stress when 
selecting shorter-term investments. One study found that male trading 
 
managers to earn solid returns while going through a divorce; see id. 
 75 Linette Lopez, I’m a Woman, And I Don’t Think Paul Tudor Jones’ Comments on 
Woman Traders Were Sexist, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2013, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/paul-tudor-jones-not-sexist-2013-5 (“His point is 
that women are expected to get married, expected to have children, and expected to 
keep a house . . . there will not be as many women who choose to live the grueling 
lifestyle of being a trader and a mother at the same time . . . .”).  
 76 Alden, supra note 74 (quoting Simone Foxman and Joanna Coles, respectively). 
 77 See Fidelity Investments, Who’s the Better Investor: Men or Women?, FIDELITY 
(May 18, 2017), https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/individual-investing/better-
investor-men-or-women. 
 78 See id. (“[A] growing body of evidence, including an analysis of more than eight 
million clients from Fidelity, shows that women actually tend to outperform men 
when it comes to generating a return on their investments.”). 
 79 See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., supra note 72, at 2; cf. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & 
Nicole M. Boyson, The Performance of Female Hedge Fund Managers, 29 REV. FIN. 
ECON. 23, 25 (2016) (finding that women and men perform about the same as hedge 
fund managers but that only the best women survive possibly because “investors are 
unwilling (for whatever reason) to invest with female hedge fund managers”). 
 80 See ROTHSTEIN KASS INST., supra note 72, at 2. 
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activity increased as male cortisol levels increased.81 In contrast, 
female traders did not react as strongly to increasing cortisol levels.82 
Another study found that women make steadier investors, trading 
significantly less than men and earning higher returns.83 Psychologists 
find that men tend to be overconfident about their actual prowess in 
financial areas.84 
b. Explicit Beliefs About Male Superiority 
Women also face additional challenges because of widespread beliefs 
that men are more biologically and socially suited to technology 
careers and leadership positions. In a widely-circulated memorandum, 
James Damore, then-engineer at Google, wrote about his concerns 
with diversity initiatives.85 He stated that “the distribution of 
preferences and abilities of men and women differ in part due to 
biological causes and that these differences may explain why we don’t 
see equal representation of women in tech and leadership.”86 His 
memorandum reported that he had received “many personal messages 
from fellow Googlers expressing their gratitude” for stating positions 
 
 81 See Carlos Cueva et al., Cortisol and Testosterone Increase Financial Risk Taking 
and May Destabilize Markets, NATURE (July 2, 2015), https://www.nature.com/ 
articles/srep11206 (“Cortisol was strongly associated with greater trading activity in 
men . . . .”). 
 82 See id. (“In contrast to the behavior of men in the experiment, women exhibited 
a borderline significant negative correlation between trading activity and 
cortisol . . . .”). 
 83 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, 
Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 262 (2001) 
(“While both men and women reduce their net returns through trading, men do so by 
0.94 percentage points more a year than do women.”). 
 84 See id. (“Psychologists find that in areas such as finance men are more 
overconfident than women.”). But see Richard T. Bliss & Mark E. Potter, Mutual Fund 
Managers: Does Gender Matter?, 8 J. BUS. & ECON. 1 (2002) (finding no evidence that 
men are more overconfident or take more risks than women or that there is any 
performance difference between men and women). Other studies find differences 
based on biological substances. See, e.g., W. V. Harlow & Keith C. Brown, 
Understanding and Assessing Financial Risk Tolerance: A Biological Perspective, 46 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 50, 60 (1990) (finding an increase of MAO enzymes in women tend to be 
associated with risk-averse behavior); Amos Nadler et al., The Bull of Wall Street: 
Experimental Analysis of Testosterone and Asset Trading, 64 MGMT. SCI. 4032 (2018) 
(finding a difference between male and female risk-taking based on presence of 
increased testosterone, a male hormone). 
 85 See generally James Damore, Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber: How Bias Clouds 
Our Thinking About Diversity and Inclusion, ASSETS (July 2017), https://assets. 
documentcloud.org/documents/3914586/Googles-Ideological-Echo-Chamber.pdf. 
 86 Id.  
  
2019] Venture Bearding 1891 
“which they agree with but would never have the courage to say or 
defend.”87 
The beliefs articulated by Damore may be widely shared within 
other technology firms, which are still dominated by men. Damore’s 
memorandum found substantial support at Google, and there is no 
good reason to believe that its employee population diverges 
significantly from that of the remainder of the industry. For example, 
Susan Fowler encountered these beliefs when she raised concerns 
about the lack of female engineers at Uber.88 The female human 
resources representative responded “with a story about how 
sometimes certain people of certain genders and ethnic backgrounds 
were better suited for some jobs than others, so [Fowler] shouldn’t be 
surprised by the gender ratios in engineering.”89 These stereotypical 
attitudes, if acted upon in workplaces to deny women jobs, 
promotions, or equal pay, would create liability under Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.90 
These beliefs appear driven more by the existing gender 
composition and social status of professions than actual differences 
between abilities of the different sexes. The history of computing 
provides an illustrative example.91 American women were 
programmers during World War II and at NASA after the war.92 
During World War II, British women primarily “assembled, trouble-
shot and ran the British Colossus computers, which decrypted coded 
messages intercepted from the German army.”93 This “technical work 
required significant skill, but it was perceived as less intellectual 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 See Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN 
FOWLER (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-
one-very-strange-year-at-uber. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-58 (1989) (declaring 
that adverse employment decisions caused by sex stereotyping is illegal). 
 91 See Claire Cain Miller, Tech’s Damaging Myth of the Loner Genius Nerd, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/upshot/techs-damaging-
myth-of-the-loner-genius-nerd.html [hereinafter Tech’s Damaging Myth] (“Computer 
programming was originally considered a woman’s job.”). 
 92 See id. (explaining that American women “were programmers of the Eniac 
during World War II and at NASA”). 
 93 Marie Hicks, Memo to the Google Memo Writer: Women Were Foundational to the 
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because women did it.”94 As computing grew more important, women 
were systematically excluded through the 1950s because the tasks 
seemed to be “too important to leave to women.”95 
Other professions experience declines in their pay and relative 
prestige as the gender balance of the profession shifts. Historically, a 
perception that an occupation had become a “woman’s profession” 
would diminish the occupation’s compensation and social prestige.96 
This happened for secretaries and teachers.97 An influx of women 
drove men to “flee, and all of the prestige [drained] out of the job.”98 
This has been labeled as the “typewriter paradox: [women] master a 
machine or set of skills that opens up job opportunities for them, and 
then that job becomes immediately devalued.”99 
This dynamic may already be occurring within different segments of 
engineering work. A distinction has emerged between front-end and 
back-end engineers.100 More women work in the lower paid front-end 
engineering area, which focuses on the user interface.101 In contrast, 
more men work in back-end engineering that concentrates on systems 
that function outside of the user’s view.102 Persons who have done 
both front-end and back-end work do not see significant differences in 
the work’s difficulty.103 
Beliefs about male superiority likely shape investing behavior. 
Beliefs that biology and socialization make men better suited for 
technology careers and leadership lead to allocating more capital to 
technology companies led by men. Ellen Pao revealed that venture 
capitalists will sometimes make these beliefs explicit and state that 
 
 94 Id. (“Who was performing the tasks, not the content of the work, defined its 
worth.”). 
 95 Id. 
 96 HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 119 (2012). 
 97 See id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. (crediting Columbia University labor historian Alice Kessler-Harris with 
coining the term). 
 100 See Miller, Tech’s Damaging Myth, supra note 91 (“One example is the 
distinction between front-end engineers, who build the parts of a product that users 
interact with, and back-end engineers, who work on behind-the-scenes systems, like 
data storage or scaling.”). 
 101 See id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. The women suing Google for pay discrimination alleged that Google 
concentrated men in the back-end and women in the front-end engineering jobs. See 
Wakabayashi, supra note 69. 
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they “think it’s young white men, ideally Ivy League dropouts, who 
are the safest bets.”104 
3. Systemic Problems in Workplace Cultures 
Women often encounter problems in male-dominated work 
environments.105 In many ways, the current venture capital and Silicon 
Valley work environments resemble the misogynistic Wall Street 
cultures that were revealed in the 1980s.106 Women in the technology 
sector and the venture capital industry often encounter sexual 
harassment and misogynistic social and workplace cultures 
proliferate.107 These toxic masculine cultures make founding new 
ventures more difficult and also complicate women’s employment in 
the sector, reducing opportunities for women to acquire experience 
before launching a venture.108 Sex segregation leads to discrimination 
and harassment based on sex.109 And, work environments that are 
predominantly male tend to exhibit exaggerated forms of toxic 
masculinity. Men police the boundaries of the workplace in order to 
confirm their own masculinity to themselves and to the group, and 
 
 104 Pao, How Sexism Works, supra note 1 (quoting unnamed VCs); see also HEWLETT 
ET AL., THE ATHENA FACTOR, supra note 45, at 9-10. 
 105 See McGinley, Masculinities at Work, supra note 32, at 409 (“[E]xperience 
shows that men in predominately male work environments often denigrate women 
and other males who do not conform to gender norms, using gender specific language 
that equates inferiority with being female or feminine.”). 
 106 For detailed descriptions of sexual harassment in Wall Street firms in the 1980s, 
see generally SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM-BOOM ROOM: THE LANDMARK LEGAL 
BATTLES THAT EXPOSED WALL STREET’S SHOCKING CULTURE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
(2003). 
 107 See PAO, RESET, supra note 2, at 182-83 (reporting how one female cofounder 
received “horrendously sexist, racist, and otherwise inappropriate comments”); Katie 
Benner, Women in Tech Speak Frankly on Culture of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/technology/women-entrepreneurs-speak-
out-sexual-harassment.html?hpw&rref=technology&action=click&pgtype=Homepage 
&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well (“[S]exual harassment 
in the tech start-up ecosystem goes beyond one firm and is pervasive and ingrained.”). 
 108 See CATHERINE ASHCRAFT & SARAH BLITHE, NAT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN IN TECH., 
WOMEN IN IT: THE FACTS 1, 15 (2010), http://www.ncwit.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/pdf/NCWIT_TheFacts_rev2010.pdf (“[F]emale attrition is higher in 
technology than in science and in engineering, but across all three climates, it is 
considerably higher than men’s attrition.”). 
 109 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 
1756-61 (1998). 
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harass and discriminate against women interlopers in an attempt to 
force them out and establish the work as necessarily masculine.110 
Consider the challenges Susan Fowler reported that she faced at 
Uber.111 When she began her “first official day” with her new team, 
her manager told her that he “was trying to stay out of trouble at 
work . . . but he couldn’t help getting in trouble, because he was 
looking for women to have sex with.”112 Although she reported the 
behavior to human resources immediately, nothing was done because 
human resources said it was his “first offense,” and he was perceived 
to be a “high performer.”113 Fowler reported that her concerns were 
widely shared by other women working at Uber.114 
In response to Fowler’s allegations, Uber launched internal 
investigations into its culture and alleged misconduct.115 Concerns 
about Uber’s workplace environment emerged into public view.116 
Women reported that they had been groped at company retreats.117 
Leaked audio from internal meetings revealed female engineers calling 
for then-CEO Travis Kalanick to recognize “that there is a systemic 
problem here.”118 Concerns about Kalanick emerged as well. One 
report revealed that in 2014 he had taken employees to sing karaoke at 
“an escort bar, where customers may pay for the company of women, 
 
 110 See ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITY AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
THROUGH A DIFFERENT LENS 53 (2016); Schultz, supra note 109, at 1762-71. 
 111 See Fowler, supra note 88. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. (“I began to meet more women engineers in the company. As I got to 
know them, and heard their stories, I was surprised that some of them had stories 
similar to my own. Some of the women even had stories about reporting the exact 
same manager I had reported . . . .”). 
 115 See Todd C. Frankel, Ex-Uber Engineer Whose Complaint Started Firm’s Internal 
Investigation Dismisses Findings as “Optics,” WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/13/ex-uber-engineer-
whose-complaint-started-firms-internal-investigation-dismisses-findings-as-optics/ 
?utm_term=.37a7024eb92a (“Fowler is widely credited with causing ride-hailing giant 
Uber to launch an internal investigation into its workplace culture after her personal 
blog post earlier this year detailed her experiences as an Uber engineer.”). 
 116 See Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-
workplace-culture.html?_r=0. 
 117 See id. (“One Uber manager groped female co-workers’ breasts at a company 
retreat in Las Vegas.”). 
 118 Priya Anand, Uber Women to CEO Travis Kalanick: We Have A Systemic Problem, 
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and some members of the party picked out dates for the evening.”119 
This behavior is not unusual in predominantly male fields, and female 
employees are forced to decide whether they will go along and try to 
become one of the boys.120 
The internal investigations at Uber resulted in some actions, 
including firings121 and a slew of recommendations that were 
unanimously adopted by Uber’s board of directors.122 The report 
recommended reallocating the portfolio of “responsibilities that Mr. 
Kalanick has historically possessed” as well as steps to empower a 
“senior leader who is responsible for diversity and inclusion.”123 
Uber’s attempts to minimize the reputational damage from the 
scandals misfired, seeming to confirm the hostile environment for 
women. After Uber’s lone female board member, Arianna Huffington, 
told the press that “this is not a systemic problem” at Uber,124 another 
board member generated additional commentary with a sexist 
remark.125 In a staff meeting organized for the purpose of discussing 
the company’s culture, Huffington told attendees that having “one 
woman on a board often leads to more women joining a board.”126 
Another board member responded that “[a]ctually, what it shows is 
that it’s much more likely to be more talking.”127 
 
 119 Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-
himself-to-the-precipice.html. 
 120 See, e.g., Meredith Lepore, Going to Strip Clubs with My Male Coworkers is Part of My 
Career Strategy, GRINDSTONE (Dec. 23, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20140707104650/http://www.thegrindstone.com/2011/12/23/career-management/going-
to-strip-clubs-with-my-male-coworkers-is-part-of-my-career-strategy-300/ (noting that 
women who work with men in financing are faced with supporting or at least ignoring 
their colleagues’ violent and aggressive behavior in strip clubs as part of their work). 
 121 Mike Isaac, Uber Fires 20 Amid Investigation into Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/technology/uber-fired.html 
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 122 Mike Isaac, Uber Embraces Major Reforms as Travis Kalanick, the C.E.O., Steps 
Away, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/ 
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 123 Holder Recommendations on Uber, N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/13/technology/document-The-Holder-
Report-on-Uber.html. 
 124 Isaac, Workplace Culture, supra note 121. 
 125 Mike Isaac & Susan Chira, David Bonderman Resigns from Uber Board After 
Sexist Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/ 
technology/uber-sexual-harassment-huffington-bonderman.html. 
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 127 Id. (quoting David Bonderman). This misogynist response apparently reflects 
the “Bernie Bros.” mentality of Silicon Valley. See, e.g., Thrity Umrigar, Bernie Bros 
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Although Fowler and others brought attention to Uber’s work 
environment, challenges persist throughout the technology space. At 
Social Finance (“SoFi”), a startup with a four billion valuation, CEO 
Mike Cagney “bragged about his sexual conquests and the size of his 
genitalia.”128 SoFi’s chief financial officer would talk “openly about 
women’s breasts and once offered female employees bonuses for losing 
weight.”129 
Survey data confirms that these cultures are common. One survey 
found that sixty percent of women in the tech industry had received 
unwanted sexual advances in the workplace.130 Most of these 
unwanted sexual advances came from superiors, with many 
respondents reporting persistent advances from the same superiors.131 
These workplace dynamics make it difficult for women to remain in 
the industry. 
4. Implicit Bias 
In addition to the other factors identified, implicit bias against 
female founders likely plays a significant role in raising the cost of 
raising capital for women. Unlike purposeful discrimination, implicit 
bias occurs as a product of automatic mental associations and 
processes.132 A convincing body of social science research 
demonstrates that implicit expectations affect how persons absorb new 
information.133 Stereotypes play a significant role in human cognition 
 
Made Me Finally Recognize Misogyny in America, HUFFPOST (May 5, 2016, 9:11 AM 
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 128 Nathaniel Popper & Katie Benner, “It Was a Frat House”: Inside the Sex Scandal 
That Toppled SoFi’s C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/09/12/technology/sofi-chief-executive-toxic-workplace.html. 
 129 Id. The same CFO also reportedly said that “women would be happier as 
homemakers” than working at technology firms. Id. 
 130 ELEPHANT IN THE VALLEY, https://www.elephantinthevalley.com (last visited Dec. 
20, 2018). 
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 132 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Symposium on Behavioral 
Realism: Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (“This 
Article introduces implicit bias — an aspect of the new science of unconscious mental 
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and tend to influence decisions — even for individuals who genuinely 
believe that they make decisions as impartial umpires on a case-by-
case basis without stereotyping others.134 
The largely white male venture capital population may be 
particularly vulnerable to implicit bias in decision-making for a variety 
of reasons.135 A lack of awareness or concern about widespread 
discrimination may lead white male venture capitalists to underinvest 
in precautions to prevent their own implicit biases from skewing 
investment decisions.136 When these biases affect capital allocation 
decisions, venture capitalists may not succeed at selecting the most 
profitable investment opportunities. One survey found that white male 
venture capitalists and founders were significantly less aware “of 
sexism and racism within the tech industry.”137 They also reported 
significantly different experiences when seeking to raise capital, with 
most women reporting encountering sexism and only eight percent of 
men reporting any observation of sexism in the capital raising 
process.138 
 
inconsistent behavior that did occur is stored in a more diffuse manner and is thus 
less readily retrievable by the decision-maker.”). 
 134 See Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women 
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Bias may manifest in different ways. One study found that venture 
capitalists ask different questions of male and female founders.139 The 
venture capitalists “tended to ask men questions about the potential 
for gains and women about the potential for losses.”140 The researchers 
found that the bias in question style extended to both male and female 
venture capitalists.141 
Implicit biases may play a particularly large role in venture capital 
investments because early-stage firms often have short track records 
and do not provide much data for analysis. In this environment, 
research has found that investors key off of the limited available “hard 
data” and their “perceptions of the founding entrepreneur.”142 Some 
early-stage investors rely almost entirely on intuition. One reported 
that he did not “care about the business plan . . . as much as I care 
about the entrepreneur. My most successful deals have come when I 
trust my gut feelings . . . when I trust only what my gut tells me about 
the entrepreneur, and filter everything else out.”143 Research shows, 
however, that due to stereotypes and implicit biases, the “gut” may fail 
in determining which ventures deserve funding.144 
Empirical research shows that investor’s guts have strong filters. 
These “gut” filters favor men, particularly attractive men.145 One novel 
series of studies sought to shed light on whether “the gender 
imbalance is due to irrational investor behavior.”146 In one study, the 
researchers presented participants with the same pitches, alternating 
whether a male or female voice read the pitch scripts.147 Both male and 
female participants preferred pitches presented by male voices, with 
the male pitch winning 68.33% of the time.148 When the researchers 
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added photos to the pitches, participants were “significantly more 
likely to invest after watching the high-attractiveness male’s pitch.”149 
Collectively, the researcher’s studies found “a profound and consistent 
gender gap in entrepreneur persuasiveness.”150 Another study 
concludes that venture capital is influenced by tangible education and 
work history credentials, in tandem with cultural beliefs about gender. 
There are two distinct aspects of venture capitalists’ evaluations: 
evaluations of the venture and those of the entrepreneur. When 
evaluating the entrepreneur, venture capitalists valued the technical 
degree for women much more than for men, largely because in high-
tech entrepreneurship cultures, hegemonic forms of masculinity are 
strongly associated with masculinity and technological prowess and 
power. Women who lacked documentation of technical expertise 
through an educational degree were deemed to be less compatible to 
assume leadership roles in technological companies than men with the 
same qualifications.151 Interestingly, women with technical 
backgrounds and men with non-technical backgrounds appeared to 
have an advantage in leadership and sociability ratings over their 
same-gender counterparts.152 Moreover, for women, the study found, a 
trusted social tie to the evaluator is more important to the evaluation 
than for male founders.153 
 
 149 Id.  
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Anecdotal accounts of venture capital processes cohere with 
research findings that investors may misallocate capital toward 
attractive men and favor their guts over hard data. For example, Ellen 
Pao reported that if “the guy pitching was hyper-confident and used a 
lot of technical language, I saw my colleagues take the bait again and 
again.”154 She recounts an instance where venture capitalists “were 
dead set on pouring more money into” a company led by “a 
charismatic Texan with just enough knowledge of tech to be 
convincing and more confidence than all our other CEOs 
combined.”155 The venture capitalists made the investment without 
doing financial due diligence even though two chief financial officers 
had recently “quit after short stints on the job, one after just two 
weeks.”156 
B. Capital Allocation Problems 
Systemic gender bias in the capital allocation process drives a host of 
problems. Bias in venture capital firms has an outsized impact because 
of the amount of capital allocated and the economic activity driven by 
venture capital firms. One study found that “public companies with 
venture capital backing employ four million people and account for 
one-fifth of the market capitalization and forty-four percent of the 
research and development spending of U.S. public companies.”157 
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While the investing acumen of venture capitalists plays a role in the 
success of venture-backed companies, broader regulatory changes 
directing more of society’s capital to venture capital firms also drive 
growth. In particular, venture capital firms received massive capital 
inflows after pension regulations changed.158 As pension rules relaxed, 
capital inflows to venture capital firms increased from a relatively 
modest $0.1 billion to “$4.5 billion annually from 1982 to 1987.”159 
The capital now gushing into the sector because of these changes 
allows venture capital firms to fund an increasing volume of 
companies, increasing the total number of successes. 
1. Increased Capital Costs Underutilize Women’s Talents 
The cost of capital plays a critical role in business growth and 
formation. Lower capital costs allow founders to raise funds more 
easily and put more capital to work in their ventures.160 Entrepreneurs 
without their own capital acquire capital in the markets by offering 
investors a slice of their venture’s equity ownership or by committing 
to repay a loan.161 As a general policy preference, policies and norms 
that lower capital costs and facilitate capital acquisition lead to 
increased economic growth.162 
Importantly, the cost of capital to an early-stage entrepreneur 
depends not only on the amount of equity she must trade in exchange 
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for capital but also on the transaction costs associated with making the 
deal.163 In the venture capital context, some relevant transaction costs 
for raising capital include the costs associated with: (1) preparing a 
pitch; (2) getting access to venture capitalists; (3) negotiating deal 
terms; and (4) continued negotiations with venture capitalists over 
governance, business strategy, and subsequent rounds of capital 
raising.164 
The cost of capital affects all stakeholders. As transaction costs and 
the cost of capital increase, overall economic efficiency declines. This 
happens because transaction costs act as a friction in the deal-making 
and economic development engine.165 High capital costs undercut real 
investment, leading to a reduction in job creation, innovation, and 
development.166 In contrast, market developments that reduce 
transaction costs and the cost of capital drive economic growth.167 
Pervasive gender bias means that female founders face higher and 
different capital costs than their male peers. In particular, women 
often report a deal-making environment where investors seek to 
acquire sexual access to their bodies while negotiating financing 
terms.168 Advances may happen even with investors who publicly 
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portray themselves as diversity allies. For example, when Melinda 
Epler met with a potential investor about funding for a startup 
accelerator focused on woman-led companies, he “moved his hand 
close to hers, let his knee brush against hers and advised her that male 
investors would find her attractive and she should say nothing when 
they spoke to her or touched her in inappropriate ways.”169 The 
investor also cautioned her against speaking out about the constant 
advances because investors would blacklist her and frustrate her plans 
to raise capital.170 Epler now “advises women and underrepresented 
minorities not to waste their time trying to raise money from venture 
capitalists.”171 
2. Reduced Innovation and Diminished Economic Efficiency 
Gender bias in venture capital investment processes may generate 
suboptimal returns for investors and society. This happens when the 
bias of the persons allocating capital skews the allocation of capital 
away from more productive uses and toward allocations preferred by 
the capital allocators.172 This can happen in different ways. In the 
retail investment sector, financial incentives for financial advisers to 
recommend particular products creates a bias toward convincing 
investors to allocate capital to less profitable ventures that return more 
capital to intermediaries than to investors.173 In the venture capital 
space, a bias against women as entrepreneurs may mean that profitable 
and social-welfare-enhancing innovations become less likely to be 
pursued. 
Pervasive bias against women reduces the efficiency of capital 
allocation processes — causing capital to flow to suboptimal uses. 
This may cause underinvestment in businesses and technology serving 
markets that white male venture capitalists do not understand. For 
example, white male venture capitalists may not have much familiarity 
with breast pumps.174 Their lack of experience with the product may 
make it more difficult for them to recognize its value. 
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This is not the only way in which male-dominated capital allocation 
processes may undervalue investment opportunities associated with 
female leaders. For example, the broader financial industry skews 
overwhelmingly male, though less so than the venture capital 
subsector.175 Hedge funds, with only about two percent managed by 
women, share roughly similar gender ratios with venture capital 
funds.176 Despite this, the women that do receive capital in the hedge 
fund space tend to outperform their male-led peers by significant 
margins.177 
Venture capital firms that fail to correct for bias in their capital 
allocation processes miss profitable opportunities. Some evidence 
indicates that startups with female founders tend to outperform all-
male teams. One venture capital firm recently released the results from 
ten years of investing data.178 It found that firms “with a female 
founder performed 63% better than [its] investments with all-male 
founding teams.”179 
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II. A THEORY OF VENTURE BEARDING 
The term venture bearding encapsulates the ways in which women 
now perform their identities in response to social and economic 
preferences for idealized white or Asian male identities in startups, 
technology, and venture capital firms. This Part relates venture 
bearding to identity performance theory. It details how persons with 
stigmatized identities convert, pass, and cover their identities to access 
social and economic benefits despite their subordinated status. It 
introduces venture bearding as an alternative form of identity 
performance at the intersection of entity formation and identity 
performance. 
A. The Frame: Identity Performance Theory 
Identity performance theory provides a frame for analyzing how 
gender discrimination in startup, technology, and venture capital firms 
forces women to assimilate in ways that reify discriminatory norms.180 
As explained above, stigma attaches to persons who differ from the 
idealized, masculine identity prized in the technology and venture 
capital context.181 A range of scholars have catalogued how members 
of lower status groups will “undertake identity mobilizing strategies to 
join ‘higher status’ groups by negating characteristics associated with 
the ‘low status’ group.”182 Social psychologist Erving Goffman broke 
identity-negating strategies into three categories: conversion, passing, 
and covering.183 In his scholarship on antidiscrimination, Kenji 
Yoshino applied Goffman’s concepts to detail identity negation in the 
context of sexual orientation, race, and sex.184 Conversion here refers 
to ways in which an individual alters her underlying identity to move 
out of the stigmatized group.185 Passing refers to instances where “the 
underlying identity is not altered, but hidden.”186 Covering captures 
 
 180 See Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 874-76 
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instances where a person downplays her underlying identity and 
minimizes its salience so as to make “it easy for others to disattend” 
the fact of her identity.187 
1. Conversion 
When persons experience strong stigma on account of particular 
characteristics, converting or changing that underlying characteristic 
may allow them to escape stigma.188 Persons will literally alter their 
identities at great personal cost “to blend into the mainstream.”189 
Even though many now consider sexual orientation as an immutable 
characteristic,190 homosexuals were (and to some extent are still) 
subjected to demands to convert to heterosexual orientations.191 
Social, legal, and financial pressures from dominant identity 
paradigms have driven persons to attempt to convert many identity 
characteristics to more socially advantageous characteristics. 
Immigrants who converted their names to more “American” versions 
experienced greater economic prosperity than those who did not.192 
Health insurance fat taxes have mandated that people who are 
overweight convert their “fat bodies” into thin bodies to escape 
financial penalties.193 Many persons have converted from one faith to 
another and gained access to and membership in new communities.194 
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 188 See id. at 774 (“When discriminatory animus against an identity is particularly 
strong, it may require conversion.”). 
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member of the majority faith community. In other words, she has moved from 
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2. Passing 
Passing strategies allow persons with disfavored identities to pass as 
members of the dominant social group by hiding the disfavored 
aspects of their identity.195 Passing allows outgroup members to access 
the social and economic privilege they would be denied if their true 
identities were known.196 For example, lesbians who do not reveal 
their orientation may access economic opportunities that would 
otherwise be foreclosed.197 
Individuals have also used corporate entities to conceal their 
identities.198 For example, before the Supreme Court ruled that 
covenants forbidding the sale of land to Black purchasers were 
unconstitutional,199 Major Joseph B. Johnson, a former slave, used a 
corporate entity to buy land with a restrictive covenant.200 Even 
though the “corporation [was] composed exclusively of negroes,” 201 a 
Virginia court declined to unsettle the purchase, instead treating the 
corporation as a distinct legal entity.202 
A new dynamic, reverse passing, has also emerged.203 The term 
describes “the process by which whites shed their white racial identity 
 
disadvantaged characteristic.”). 
 195 See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 772 (“Passing occurs when a lesbian presents 
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the state courts cannot stand.”). 
 200 See Brooks, Incorporating Race, supra note 198, at 2024. 
 201 People’s Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder, 61 S.E. 794, 795 (Va. 1908), aff’d on 
reh’g, 63 S.E. 981 (Va. 1909). 
 202 Id. at 796. 
 203 See Beydoun & Wilson, Reverse Passing, supra note 196, at 288-89. 
  
1908 University of California, Davis [Vol. 52:1873 
in exchange for a nonwhite racial identity.”204 This new dynamic may 
have emerged because of a shifting “valuation scheme within the racial 
hierarchy caused in part by modern affirmative action 
jurisprudence.”205 
3. Covering 
Covering occurs when a person with a stigmatized identity 
characteristic minimizes, downplays, and otherwise avoids drawing 
attention to that characteristic.206 Yoshino explained that covering 
requires “that the individual modulate her conduct to make her 
difference easy for those around her to disattend her known 
stigmatized trait.”207 People cover in many different ways and whether 
a behavior serves to pass or cover depends on what others already 
know.208 
Khaled Beydoun has described ways in which American Muslims 
now cover to avoid stigmatization.209 Immediately after the election of 
President Trump, some Muslim women stopped wearing headscarves 
to reduce the salience of their religious identities.210 Beydoun explains 
that a “Muslim American male that chooses to shave his beard, for fear 
of being perceived as an extremist or profiled as a radical . . . 
capitulates to the negative stereotypes and stigmas the state ascribes to 
specific expressions of Muslim identity.”211 Others may cover by going 
by Anglicized names.212 
In Acting White? Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America, Devon 
Carbado and Mitu Gulati describe behavior of African American 
workers who perform their racial identities in less threatening ways in 
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order to gain acceptance in majority-white workplaces.213 According to 
Carbado and Gulati, although members of all races perform their 
identities in the workplace in order to gain the favor of employers, 
“race can increase the likelihood that one’s sense of self will be in 
conflict with criteria that an institution values, and, correspondingly, 
race can increase the pressure one feels to compromise one’s sense of 
identity.”214 Racial minorities engage in six different strategies in order 
to conform to employer expectations, all of which create discomfort 
and conflict for the employee.215 These strategies include: racial 
comfort, strategic passing, using prejudice, racial discomfort, selling 
out, and buying back.216 These strategies come at a cost to the 
individual applicant or employee who has to perform more work than 
others in order be successful at work, and must often sacrifice his or 
her true identity to comply.217 
Women, too, face demands to engage in covering and other 
strategies to assure that others accept them in the tech and venture 
capital worlds. Yet they also often face contradictory demands to both 
downplay and amplify their femininity at the same time. Yoshino 
describes this dynamic as the requirement for women to both cover 
and to reverse cover — “to signal [their] outgroup status along other 
axes.”218 The demands for women to both downplay their difference 
and accentuate their femininity forces women “to strike an 
Archimedian mean between the poles of being too masculine and 
being too feminine.”219 It is a particularly difficult line to walk in the 
tech industry. As in other industries, female leaders must prove they 
are communal in order to soften their image as unlikeable, but if they 
are considered too communal, they run the risk of being seen as 
incompetent. In the tech industry, women explain that they must 
learn to act like men. They avoid and look down on other women, 
knowing that their professional success depends on withstanding 
aggressive male behavior.220 But the women’s adoption of male styles 
is not always successful: it can backfire. Women who adopt men’s 
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styles tend to attack other women as “petty” and “emotional,” thereby 
destroying the possibility of solidarity that could potentially be found 
in women’s networks. And, in the end, it is virtually impossible for a 
woman, even one who adopts a male persona, to join the “old boys’ 
club.”221 Ellen Pao’s story of a woman who played the game but then 
ultimately was characterized as not a team player or too aggressive 
demonstrates what happens to a woman who is perceived to be too 
masculine.222 
B. Venture Bearding as Identity Performance 
Shifting identity performance to avoid mistreatment and access 
social and economic benefits is not a new phenomenon.223 There are 
many distinctive things that women and minorities “feel pressured to 
do because of negative assumptions about their identities.”224 This 
Article draws on this identity performance frame to coin the process as 
venture bearding. With venture bearding strategies, women negotiate 
and perform not only their own identities but also the identities of 
startup firms in order to be successful in their businesses. These 
strategies, like those of racial minorities in majority-white workplaces, 
are, at a minimum, more work. They also deny the true identities of 
the women who employ them, behavior that takes a personal and 
psychological toll, and that harms the public because it does not 
challenge the stereotypes and assumptions that deny female venture 
capitalists equal treatment.225 
The existence of these strategies testifies to the greater degree of 
opportunity afforded to masculine men. In practice, even ingenious 
venture bearding strategies highlight and reproduce the negative 
stereotypes ascribed to women’s identities. By yielding to pressures to 
perform their entities in particular ways, women leave discriminatory 
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norms unchallenged. This is not to say that female entrepreneurs and 
employees act wrongfully when they cover or otherwise conform to 
the dominant paradigm, but rather that they may continue to harm 
themselves and others by confirming the belief that men are superior 
entrepreneurs. To blame women who engage in covering or passing is 
to blame the victim of the industry’s discriminatory attitudes and 
behaviors. 
The costs of resisting social pressures and unjust gender 
expectations may be too great to force onto the shoulders of 
individuals seeking access to economic and social resources.226 
Women must often consider the interests of other stakeholders when 
they decide how to perform their own identities and how to the shape 
the identities of their ventures. For business leaders, this may include 
duties to existing investors, employees, and others who have a stake in 
the success of a business venture. It may also include family 
obligations. 
1. Substitution 
Identity performance theory predicts that the strength of 
discriminatory animus against an identity will drive the responses to 
it.227 Particularly hostile environments will drive individuals to 
convert their underlying identity characteristics if they are able.228 As 
animus diminishes, the diminished pressure may allow persons to pass 
or to cover their identities.229 
As predicted by identity performance theory, some women attempt 
strategies approaching conversion to access capital. In at least one 
instance, a female founder strategically converted to a mixed-gender 
enterprise to increase her ability to access capital.230 She substituted a 
man as the public face of the venture to facilitate her access to capital. 
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a female founder revealed 
that she had grown frustrated with pitching groups of all-male venture 
capitalists. She perceived that their biases led them to discount both 
her and her startup. She believed that if a man were pitching the exact 
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same opportunity, the venture capitalists would be significantly more 
likely to provide the funding she needed to grow the business.231 Her 
comments revealed a firm conviction that discriminatory animus 
against her sex made raising capital more difficult. 
For the purpose of evading discriminatory biases, she strategically 
converted the startup from an all-female-led firm to a mixed gender 
firm. She brought a man into the venture to facilitate capital 
acquisition, allowing the firm to present a masculine identity when 
pitching investors. Conversion in this context differed from others 
because the founder converted the identity of the startup instead of 
her own. By offering contingent equity to a man and putting a 
masculine identity in front of venture capitalists, she converted the 
identity of the startup in a meaningful sense. 
But there are limits to this form of conversion. The founder 
described a desire to inhabit a male body as an avatar for purposes of 
interacting with venture capitalists. She remarked that she wanted to 
“use a bro like a puppet” and that it would be easier if she could “just 
put [her] hand up his ass to move his mouth.” 
The use of a man as a venture beard resulted in some disjunction. 
On the substance, he lacked her mastery. He also lacked her drive and 
passion for the product. She could not control his presentation as she 
could her own. After he completed a number of unsuccessful pitches, 
she ultimately abandoned the strategy and fired him. 
It may be impossible to know whether this incident represents an 
isolated case or a more widespread phenomenon. Although predicted 
by identity performance theory, the female entrepreneurs pursuing 
these conversion strategies (and the often bearded men in their 
employ) have little incentive to reveal themselves publicly. 
2. Manclusion 
Venture bearding also occurs when women elevate men from the 
background to the foreground to derive economic and social benefits 
from their male privilege. To describe the dynamic, we coin the term 
manclusion. Manclusion occurs when women elevate and include men 
in economic activities because the presence of the man causes other 
men to moderate their behavior and improves outcomes.232 
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As a strategy, manclusion represents a different form of venture 
bearding than substitution. With manclusion, the woman does not 
abdicate her official position as the leader of an entity — she simply 
elevates and includes a man in economic and social interactions. 
Consider the difficulties faced by Janica Alvarez, the CEO of startup 
Naya Health Inc., a company offering a popular line of smart breast 
pumps.233 When she went to pitch investors on her own, they would 
ask her “how a mother of three stays in such good shape” or how she 
could manage the company and her kids at the same time.234 In one 
meeting, “investors Googled the product and ended up on a porn site. 
They lingered on the page and started cracking jokes” about the 
pornography.235 
To keep investor meetings on track, Alvarez adopted a manclusion 
strategy — she started “bringing her husband with her to pitch 
meetings.”236 Once she inserted his masculine identity into the room, 
“investors never made disparaging comments or asked about the 
challenges of running a company as a parent.”237 Her husband, a 
medical device engineer, said that without him investors treated “her 
like a little girl trying to play a man’s game.”238 
Manclusion — the inclusion of a man to induce better behavior from 
other men — grants women access to a borrowed degree of male 
privilege. This venture bearding strategy works because our culture 
habituates men to extend respect to other men. Men may hesitate 
before showing disrespect to a woman associated with another man 
because they may see the woman as that man’s property. Because of 
the fear introduced by the presence of a potential enforcer, other men 
moderate their behavior. 
Manclusion appears particularly distinctive because it is a unique 
strategy for women in male-dominated environments. Men entering 
female-dominated environments do not become imbued with a similar 
social cachet by pulling women of lower rank in their business 
hierarchy into meetings with outsiders. 
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Implementation of the strategy does not always require physical 
interactions. Manclusion may also operate effectively through email 
communications. It happens when women copy men from their 
organization on email exchanges so that their digital presence will 
induce better behavior from their outside correspondents. 
Manclusion remains problematic for a variety of reasons. It bestows 
economic benefits, access, and inclusion upon men simply because of 
their existing male privilege. By definition, manclusion occurs only 
when the masculine identity is useful for mitigating gender bias from 
other men. It also fails to directly challenge other men on their 
behavior, leaving misogynistic norms in place. Manclusion also 
contributes to skewed gender ratios by ensuring the 
overrepresentation of men in leadership roles. 
3. Digital Passing 
Electronic communication now allows some female entrepreneurs to 
pass for male in a limited subset of interactions. Notably, Penelope 
Gazin and Kate Dwyer digitally passed as a fictitious male cofounder 
named “Keith Mann” when interacting with outside developers.239 By 
electronically donning Mr. Mann’s masculine identity, Gazin and 
Dwyer gained access to privilege that they would not have been able to 
access under their own names.240 
Other accounts show that presenting masculine identities in online 
interactions allows women to pass for men and evade discriminatory 
bias. For example, one man realized that “women do not get the same 
respect in the workplace” after inadvertently switching email 
signatures with a female colleague.241 He reported that his female 
colleague had “the most productive week of her career” because she 
did not need to “convince clients to respect her.”242 
Female founders have been urged to pass in other ways. One 
venture capitalist published a controversial op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal putting the onus on women to conform to a genderless 
default, to pass and cover their identities online.243 He argued that 
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adopting a “gender-neutral persona allows women to access 
opportunities that might otherwise be closed to them.”244 His advice 
may be viewed as recommending passing to “make an initial 
connection with a potential employer or investor.”245 After a wave of 
criticism,246 he apologized for the “dreadful article.”247 He recognized 
that his advice “told women to endure the gender bias problem rather 
than acting to fix the problem.”248 
Freada Kapor, a technology investor and diversity advocate, pointed 
out the limited utility of the advice and rather obvious “holes in this 
strategy.”249 She explained that if women adopted the strategy while 
men continued to use their names, the use of initials would create an 
obvious marker of difference.250 The strategy also does little for 
persons with last names that suggest racial difference.251 
Ultimately, these digital passing strategies offer only limited utility 
in real world interactions. They may be more likely to backfire than to 
generate any positive result. Like other venture bearding strategies, 
digital passing decreases women’s visibility and reinforces perceptions 
that the business world belongs to men.252 
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4. Covering Continues 
Discriminatory animus in startups, technology companies, and 
venture capital firms now places extraordinary pressure on women to 
both cover and reverse cover at the same time.253 The pressure to 
cover demands that women deflect attention from their difference 
while the simultaneous pressure to reverse cover encourages them to 
conform to expectations about behavior for women.254 Kenji Yoshino 
explained that these demands mean that for women to succeed they 
must “have the correctly titrated balance of masculine and feminine 
traits. One must be ‘authoritative’ and ‘formidable,’ but remain an 
‘appealing lady.’”255 
Demands to reverse cover may apply with less force to women who 
self-identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer. In 
particular, gender-fluid white and Asian women may enjoy greater 
success with covering strategies than women with more contextually 
stigmatized identities.256 One study detailed how these women 
experienced greater inclusion by presenting in ways that minimized 
their femininity.257 One white, bisexual woman used a “gender-neutral 
style [that] positioned her as an ‘insider’ within a male-dominated 
team and company.”258 This presentation insulated her “from the 
microaggressions and gender-based discrimination that women who 
were conventionally feminine reported.”259 Other gender-fluid women 
achieved “acceptance, in part, by cultivating a style of communication 
and dress that made them virtually indistinguishable from their male 
peers.”260 
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Yet in many instances, these identity performance demands to cover 
and reverse cover may now create insurmountable barriers. Ellen Pao’s 
autobiographical account of her experience as a venture capitalist 
reads as an extended case study in covering.261 It captures how 
inconsistent demands to both minimize gender difference and perform 
a feminine identity place women in a catch-22. She describes the 
contradictory demands to both downplay her difference from the 
masculine norm and the maddening criticisms she faced for failing to 
conform to expectations about her identity: 
We are either silenced or we are seen as buzzkills. We are 
either left out of the social network that leads to power — the 
strip clubs and the steak dinners and the all-male ski trips — 
and so we don’t fit in, or our presence leads to changes in the 
way things are done, and that causes anger, which means we 
still don’t fit in. If you talk, you talk too much. If you don’t 
talk, you’re too quiet. You don’t own the room. If you want to 
protect your work, you’re not a team player. Your elbows are 
too sharp. You’re too aggressive. If you don’t protect your 
work, you should be leaning in. If you don’t negotiate, you’re 
underpaid. If you do negotiate, you’re complaining. If you 
want a promotion, you’re overreaching. If you don’t ask for a 
promotion, you get assigned all the unwanted tasks.262 
The continuing pressure for outgroup entrepreneurs to both cover 
and reverse affects their ability to access capital and other economic 
benefits. 
III. LEGAL AND PRIVATE ORDERING RESPONSES 
Venture bearding does not always allow founders to overcome bias 
and access capital. Even when it does, it still requires many founders 
to pay a relatively higher cost to access capital than founders with 
favored identities. If anything, venture bearding practices may reinforce 
discriminatory norms and increase the overall cost of capital for 
persons without idealized identities. This Part argues that because of 
the limited reach of anti-discrimination laws, stakeholders should 
consider options to promote equality and enhance economic growth. 
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A. The Limited Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law 
Traditional anti-discrimination law interventions may not succeed at 
reshaping the business environment.263 The most basic reason for this 
failure is that Title VII law applies only to employers in an 
employment relationship with employees. Thus, a founder attempting 
to find investors will not have this relationship with those from whom 
she seeks investment. Moreover, even if there is an employer-
employee relationship, Title VII often requires an employee to prove 
that she has been treated discriminatorily based on her sex by 
comparing her treatment with others who are not members of her 
protected class. If there is open and obvious discrimination against a 
woman as a woman, this requirement of proving a comparator is not 
necessary, but if the discriminatory treatment is subtle, most courts 
like to see a comparator who has been treated differently. Moreover, as 
in Ellen Pao’s case, once a victim gets to the jury, proving 
discriminatory motive is not easy — the jury concluded that despite 
the terrible treatment she endured which seemed to result from her 
sex that she had not proved that she was a victim of sex 
discrimination. This result seems to be due to her failure to convince 
the jury that she was not an aggressive “bitch,” a stereotype in itself, 
who deserved what she got. Finally, although there are causes of 
action under Title VII that redress both intentional and non-
intentional systemic discrimination, Title VII emphasizes individual 
bad actors who reach discriminatory results against other individuals, 
rather than systemic discrimination, and the Court has made it 
exceedingly difficult to prove systemic cases.264 
B. Private Law and Market Responses 
A close focus on venture capitalists and entrepreneurs risks missing 
other critical, and often passive, silent, stakeholders.265 Venture capital 
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firms serve as intermediaries between institutional investors and 
entrepreneurs.266 Because institutional investors provide venture 
capital firms with much of the capital venture capitalists use to strike 
deals with entrepreneurs, institutional investors enjoy some leverage 
to address bias in the capital allocation process. 
Notably, the investors providing capital to venture capital funds 
have substantially different rights than the shareholders of publicly 
traded corporations. Because institutional investors possess limited 
rights under current agreements, institutional investors may seek to 
negotiate for governance covenants in future agreements. 
1. Limited Options for Fiduciary Suits Under Existing Agreements 
Venture capital firms generally owe specific contractual and 
fiduciary duties to their investors.267 Most courts and theorists 
recognize that default fiduciary duties include duties of care, loyalty, 
and good faith.268 In theory, institutional investors might consider 
suits against venture capitalists for breaches of these fiduciary duties if 
misconduct by venture capitalists causes damage to the venture capital 
fund. 
In practice, however, suits against venture capital funds for breaches 
of fiduciary duty may be extraordinarily difficult. Most venture capital 
firms organize their funds as limited partnerships under Delaware 
law.269 Delaware allows “drafters of Delaware limited partnerships to 
modify or eliminate fiduciary-based principles of governance, and 
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displace them with contractual terms.”270 Venture capital firms take 
full advantage of this freedom and typically create limited partnership 
agreements that waive default fiduciary duties.271 
Without the protection of fiduciary duties, investors may struggle to 
use lawsuits to hold venture capitalists accountable for their 
misbehavior. If a limited partnership agreement waives duties of care 
and loyalty, an investor is unlikely to win a suit alleging that venture 
capitalists breached nonexistent duties. Given the limited options 
available to institutional investors under existing agreements, 
institutional investors must exert influence through other channels. 
Initial and reinvestment periods provide institutional investors with 
significant bargaining leverage.272 Most venture capital funds exist for 
approximate ten-year terms.273 During this window of time, 
institutional investors may bargain for additional contractual 
covenants or fiduciary duties, giving them influence over future 
funding cycles. Institutional investors may focus their efforts at 
securing specific covenants from venture capital firms to advance 
equality and ensure that the venture capital fund invests in a gender-
diverse portfolio. 
2. A Private Ordering Mechanism: Governance Covenants 
Governance covenants may provide a mechanism for private law to 
address invidious discrimination in the venture capital space.274 
Institutional investors expect venture capitalists to add value to early-
stage companies beyond simply providing a mechanism to transfer 
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large sums of institutional capital to early-stage businesses.275 Both 
entrepreneurs and institutional investors prize venture capitalists who 
increase startup success rates by bringing their business knowledge 
and connections to bear.276 In theory, this should result in improved 
governance and decision-making by companies with venture capital 
investment. 
Institutional investors may now need to more actively focus on 
governance issues because venture capital firms have failed to mitigate 
governance risks. Recent, public, and value-destroying governance 
failures at venture-backed firms provide ample cause for institutional 
investors to pressure venture capital firms to improve governance and 
workplace cultures at their portfolio companies.277 Institutional 
investors may also need to focus on governance provisions because 
many venture-backed firms remain private for longer periods and no 
longer implement standard governance reforms to prepare for an 
initial public offering.278 
Even if institutional investors seek and obtain governance 
covenants, their efforts will only partially address the pervasive and 
systemic stigmas driving entrepreneurs to engage in venture bearding 
practices. Institutional investors have strong incentives to push for 
governance practices and policies that reduce material risks to their 
investments. To the extent that invidious bias persists in the capital 
formation space, entrepreneurs will still face pressure to perform their 
identities in ways calculated to increase access to capital. 
3. Market Forces 
Private market forces may also address bias-driven funding 
disparities. If current funding disparities are economically irrational, 
investors may achieve abnormally profitable returns by targeting 
investments toward founders with stigmatized identities.279 Some 
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funds have already embraced this theory and begun to direct capital 
toward founders with stigmatized identities.280 Consider Backstage 
Capital for an example.281 Its founder, Arlan Hamilton, calls for 
funders to recognize how current bias creates an economic 
opportunity to invest at undervalued prices.282 Other venture 
capitalists have also embraced this thesis.283 These early bets may pay 
significant returns and a single, salient success may cause other funds 
to adopt similar strategies. 
Some evidence now indicates that gender diversity improves 
financial performance at venture capital firms. One recent review 
found that “[d]iversity significantly improves financial performance 
on measures such as profitable investments at the individual portfolio-
company level and overall fund returns.”284 Researchers also found 
significant benefits for gender diversity, finding that venture capital 
“firms that increased their proportion of female partner hires by 10% 
saw, on average, a 1.5% spike in overall fund returns each year and 
had 9.7% more profitable exits (an impressive figure given that only 
28.8% of all VC investments have a profitable exit).”285 These figures 
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strongly suggest that capital allocators may achieve outperformance by 
shifting additional capital to more diverse venture capital firms. 
C. Public Intervention 
Given the importance of venture capital processes to interstate 
commerce, a future Congress might also intervene and mandate 
gender equality on the governing boards of venture capital firms with 
assets above particular amounts.286 Mandating gender parity might 
significantly reduce the need for entrepreneurs to engage in venture 
bearding behaviors to secure access to capital. It might also improve 
risk management by venture capital firms.287 Congress might conclude 
that this type of public intervention would lower the cost of capital for 
approximately half of the population and significantly increase rates of 
economic growth.288 
Public intervention might also be justified because the current 
market equilibrium that extracts venture bearding behavior from 
entrepreneurs also limits the ability of the private market to shift its 
norms. When women use venture bearding strategies to access capital, 
their presence within the market remains masked. Because women 
lack visibility in the space, the norms that require women to project 
idealized masculinized identities persist. 
If the United States took a public intervention approach, it would 
not be the first nation to mandate some form of gender parity in 
corporate governance. For example, Norway implemented reforms in 
2003 to require greater representation for women on corporate 
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boards.289 The Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality explained 
the legislation’s importance, pointing out that it would “secure 
women’s influence in decision making processes of great importance 
for the economy in the society,” and that it “is important to make use 
of all the human resources in our country, not just half of it.”290 
Other nations have followed Norway’s example and taken steps to 
address gender disparities in corporate governance. France acted in 
2011 to require that each gender comprise at least forty percent of 
public company boards.291 Germany soon followed.292 
CONCLUSION 
Widespread bias and stigmatization in the venture capital, startup, 
and technology sectors now cause many founders to adopt ingenious 
venture bearding strategies. Although these strategies now facilitate 
access to capital, their use both testifies to widespread bias and risks 
reinforcing discriminatory norms. 
Importantly, the environment giving rise to venture bearding 
strategies imposes costs on society as well as founders. A high cost of 
capital for founders with stigmatized identities means that the 
entrepreneurs best situated to serve vast markets may struggle to 
access capital and many social welfare enhancing technologies may go 
undeveloped or face significant headwinds.293 These results lead not 
only to undeveloped resources but also to the promotion of 
inequalities of non-favored groups, the very persons who have 
historically suffered from invidious discrimination. Individual female 
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In my own case, the technology I am developing — a “smart” tampon that 
tests the endometrial cells shed in menstrual fluid for disease — only 
complicates matters, partly because our potential funders are unaccustomed 
to talking about menstruation. Some of my mentors recommended I mask 
the technology itself: Strip the deck of “menstrual blood” and call it a novel 
female substrate, they suggested. Don’t say you’re a “women’s health” company. 
It signals a lack of scientific heft. I understood them to mean: Try to look as 
little as possible like what you really are — a woman-led company utilizing 
female biology to advance health care for half the population. 
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founders should not be left with the choice of venture bearding or 
losing capital. The markets combined with legal regulation should 
redress the vast inequities. 
